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3.1 Introduction
Throughout the past decade, Canadian workers were twice as likely to be
covered by a collective bargaining agreement as their U.S. counterparts (Rid-
dell, chap. 4 in this volume). Over the same period oftime, wages were more
equally distributed in Canada than in the United States (Blackburn and
Bloom, chap. 7 in this volume). These two observations raise the obvious
question of whether the different unionization rates in Canada and the United
States can explain the difference in wage inequality between the two coun-
tries. Several U.S. studies suggest this might be the case. These studies find
that unionization narrows the overall distribution of wages among men. 1 It is
thus reasonable to expect that the higher rate of unionization in Canada may
narrow even more the distribution ofwages.
The purpose ofthis paper is to compare the effects ofunionization on wage
inequality in Canada and in the United States. After a short discussion of the
role of union wage policies in the distribution of wages in section 3.2, the
paper begins by describing the patterns of unionism and wages using compa-
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1. U.S. studies that try to assess the impact of unions on the overall distribution of wages of
men include Freeman (1980, 1984) and Card (1992). See also Lewis (1986, chap. 10) for a critical
survey ofadditional studies. Swidinsky and Kupferschmidt (1991) present evidence on the impact
ofunions on residual wage inequality in Canada.
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rable cross-sectional data for Canada (the 1986 Labour Market Activity Sur-
vey[ LMAS]) and for the United States (the 1986 outgoing rotation group file
ofthe Current Population Survey [CPS]) in section 3.3. Cross-sectional esti-
mates of the effects of unions on wages may be afflicted by selectivity biases
since union workers are a nonrandom sample of the population. Panel data
methods are thus used to estimate selection-adjusted effects of unions on the
level and on the variance of wages in Canada in section 3.4. These estimates
are used to measure the overall effects ofunions on wage inequality in Canada
in section 3.5. The estimated effects of unions on wage inequality in Canada
are compared to the effects estimated by Card (1992) for the United States in
section 3.6. The main finding of the paper is that, for men, differences in
unionization rates account for 40 percent of differences in the variance of
wages between Canada and the United States.
3.2 Union Wage Policies and Overall Wage Inequality
3.2.1 Efficiency and Equity Issues
There is a long tradition in public policy analysis ofevaluating government
interventions in terms ofefficiency and equity (see, for example, Okun 1975).
Union wage policies can also be studied in such terms. In the traditional anal-
ysis of union behavior, it is postulated that unions use their monopoly power
to set the wages oftheir members above their competitive level. By creating a
wedge between wages and the opportunity cost of labor, unions thus create a
deadweight loss measured by the surface of the usual Harberger triangle (see
Harberger 1971).
It has long been recognized, however, that union wage policies also have an
important impact on the distribution of wages and thus on welfare inequality.
On the one hand, unions tend to reduce wage inequalities by standardizing
wages within the workplace. On the other hand, union wage policies may
exacerbate existing inequalities,' as they benefit union workers at the expense
ofnonunion workers. Existing studies for the United States suggest that, over-
all, unions reduce wage inequality among male workers (Freeman 1980,
1984). There may thus be a tradeoff between the efficiency costs ofunions and
the redistributive aspects ofunion wage policies. 2
Most empirical studies for Canada and the United States have implicitly
focused on the efficiency aspect of union wage policies by estimating the av-
2. Unions may have other roles aside from their effects on the level and distribution of wages.
For instance, unions may also increase productivity by giving a "voice" to workers (Freeman and
Medoff 1984). In addition, unions are positively associated with nonpecuniary benefits such as
pensions and health insurance. Unfortunately, nonpecuniary workers' benefits and productivity
effects are harder to quantify than wage effects in standard household surveys like the CPS. By
contrast, several data sets for both Canada and the United States contain good information on
wages. For these reasons, the paper focuses on the wage effects ofunions.71 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
erage effect ofunions on the level ofwages. The recent widening ofthe distri-
bution of wages in the United States, however, has revived interest in the re-
distributive aspects of union wage policies. For example, Card (1992)
concluded that 20 percent of the increase in the variance of wages of men in
the United States from 1973 to 1987 was attributable to deunionization. Free-
man (1991) reported similar findings for the 1978 to 1987 period.
Measuring the deadweight loss of union wage policies is now a standard
textbook case that will not be discussed here. 3 The remainder of the section
will explain in some detail how union 'wage policies affect the overall distri-
bution ofwages in the economy.
3.2.2 The Effects ofUnions on the Distribution ofWages
The effect ofunions on the distribution ofwages does not simply depend on
the size of the average union wage differential. It depends on the joint distri-
bution of unionization and of wages (union and nonunion) in the work force.
To see this, consider the nonunion wage of a worker i with observed charac-
teristics Xi:
W;" = wV(x) + E~,
where E~ is an error term with zero conditional mean and a conditional vari-
ance (J1(x). The wage for this same worker in the union sector is given by
wf = WU(x) + Ef,
where Ef has zero conditional mean and a conditional variance ot(x). Con-
sider U(x), the probability that worker i is unionized. Consider also the union
wage gap dw(x) for that worker,
4
dw(X) = WU(x) - wN(x),
and the union variance gap dv(x),
dv(x) = (J~(x) - (J~(x).
3. The standard formula for the deadweight loss is simply DW = (.5il~~)wL, where il is the
(average) labor demand elasticity, ~w is the (average) union wage gap, and wL is the wage bill in
the union sector (see Harberger 1971 and Rees 1963 for an application to this particular problem).
Note, however, that the simple formula is only valid when ~w, T), and the unionization rate are
either constant or independently distributed across skill groups. In general, the deadweight loss
with heterogeneous skill groups} is DW = 2/.5T);~~)wjLF
4. Note that it is implicitly assumed in this section that negotiated wages in the union sector
have no effect on wages in the nonunion sector. This assumption is unlikely to hold, since general
equilibrium considerations (Johnson and Mieszkowski 1970) suggest unions have a negative im-
pact on wages in the nonunion sector, while union threat effects (Rosen 1969) suggest the oppo-
site. The wages that prevail in the nonunion sector might thus be different from the wages that
would prevail in the absence of unions. Lewis (1986) has convincingly argued that it was not
possible to estimate the wages that would prevail in the absence of unions using standard
household-based surveys. The more limited goal of this paper is therefore to compare the actual
distribution of wages to the distribution of wages that would prevail if all workers were paid
according to the wage schedule observed in the nonunion sector.72 Thomas Lemieux
For convenience, call the group of workers with a given set of characteris-
tics x a "skill group." The average wage w(x) of workers in skill group x is
given by
(1) w(x) = ~(x) + u(x)aw(x),
while the variance ofwages among these workers, rr2(x), is given by5
(2) a
2(x) = [a1 (X) + U(X)Av(X)] + [U(X)(l - U(X»A)X)2}
The first component in square brackets is the average within-sector (union and
nonunion) variance ofwages, while the second component in square brackets
is the between-sector variance ofwages.
Now consider the overall variance ofwages, which is a standard measure of
wage dispersion. There are two components to the overall variance of wages
among workers: the variance of wages among workers with a given set of
characteristics x and the variance of wages between workers with different
characteristics x. It follows from a standard variance decomposition that the
overall variance ofwages among nonunion workers is
(3) Var("1J = Var(~(x)) + E(rr1(x)),
while the overall variance ofwages among all workers is
(4) Var(w) = Var(w(x)) + E(rr2 (x)).
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into equation (4) yields
(5) Var(w) = Var[wN(x)] + Var[U(x)aw(x)] + 2Cov[w
N(x), U(x)aw(x)]
+ E[rr1(x)] + E[U(x)av(x)] + E[U(x)(1 - U(x))aw (x)2].
The overall effect ofunions on the variance ofwages is then obtained by sub-
tracting equation (3) from equation (5):
Var(w) - Var("1J = Var[U(x)aw(x)] + 2Cov[w
N(x),U(x)aw (x)]
+ E[U(x)av(x)] + E[U(x)(1 - U(x))aw (x)2].
The effect of unions on the variance of wages is thus attributable to three
separate factors:
1. how unions change the relative position ofeach skill group in the wage
distribution,
(6)
5. This formula is derived as follows:
(J"2(X) = Var (w;lx) = Eu[Var(w;lx,U)] + Varu[E(w;lx,U)]
= (l - U(x))Var(w~lx) + U(x)Var(wflx) + Varu[wN(x) + uaw(x)]
= (1 - U(x))(J"~(x) + U(x)(J"~(x) + U(x)(l - U(x))aw (x)2.73 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
2. how unions increase the variance ofwages between union and nonunion
workers in a skill group, averaged over skill groups,
(7) E[U(x)(l - U(x))dw (X)2];
3. how unions affect the residual variance of wages within union workers
in a skill group, averaged over skill groups,
(8)
A brief examination of effects 1 and 2 indicates that they depend on the joint
distribution ofwN(x), U(x), and dw(x). It is therefore necessary to estimate this
joint distribution to evaluate the overall impact of unions on wage inequality.
The sign ofeffect 1 may be either positive or negative, depending on whether
the covariance term is negative enough to offset the variance term. This co-
variance term is negative whenever the net union wage effect Udw is larger for
workers at the low end of the skill distribution (workers with a row wN) than
for workers at the high end ofthe skill distribution.
Effect 2 is always positive, since union wage policies pull union workers
apart from nonunion workers. On the other hand, effect 3 is usually believed
to be negative, as unions tend to standardize wages among union workers
(dv < 0).
Ifall the productive characteristics ofworkers were observed in the data, it
would be straightforward to estimate dw(x), dv(x), wN(x), and thus Var(w) -
Var(~. Most estimation problems arise when some of these characteristics
are unobserved in the data. Consistent estimation ofdw(x), dv(x), and wN(x) in
that context will be addressed in section 3.4. Note also that the effect ofunions
on the variance ofwages between union and nonunion workers (effect 2) is no
longer given by formula (7) when x only represents a subset of the relevant
productive characteristics. The point is that union and nonunion workers with
the same x's could have systematically different wages even in the absence of
unions because of differences in unobserved characteristics. That underlying
difference in wages would simply be ~w(x) - dw(x), where ~w(x) is the ob-
served difference in wages between union and nonunion workers, while dw(x)
is the properly estimated effect of unions on wages. The effect of unions on
the variance of wages between union and nonunion workers would thus be-
come
(7')
The formulas for the effects 1 and 3 would remain unchanged.
3.3 Data and Basic Empirical Regularities
The effect ofunions on the variance ofwages can be obtained by estimating
the various components of equations (6), (7'), and (8). Before doing so, it is74 Thomas Lemieux
useful to describe the data used in this paper along with the basic empirical
regularities in these data. The various components ofequations (6), (7'), and
(8) will be estimated in section 3.4.
3.3.1 Data
The Canadian data used for this study were obtained by merging the 1986-
87 longitudinal file ofthe Canadian LMAS to the 1986 cross-sectional file of
the LMAS. The 1986 LMAS was administered in January, February, and
March 1987 to five rotation groups of the Canadian Labour Force Survey
(LFS).6 The public use sample consists of66,934 people aged 16-69. It con-
tains detailed information on up to five jobs held in 1986, including the usual
hourly wage rate on all paid (except self-employed) jobs and the union status
on the job.7 In this paper, workers are classified as union when they are mem-
bers ofthe union that collectively bargained with the employer, or are covered
by a collective agreement. Otherwise, they are classified as nonunion. The
LMAS also contains detailed information on the work history ofeach individ-
ual, including the reason a worker changed jobs. It is thus possible to recon-
struct the precise timing ofjob changes and to know why people did change
jobs.
Most ofthe people who were initially surveyed in 1987 (1986 LMAS) were
reinterviewed in 1988 (1987 LMAS).8 Like the 1986 LMAS, the 1987 LMAS
contains information on up to five jobs held during the year. The 1986-87
longitudinal file was created by Statistics Canada by matching the information
from the 1986 and 1987 cross-sections. The longitudinal file thus contains
information on up to ten jobs held over the 1986-87 period. Since the LMAS
is a work history survey, availability ofthe 1987 LMAS is not crucial for fixed
effect estimation. It simply doubles the length ofthe work history. In addition,
the 1987 LMAS contains useful information on ethnic origin, race, immigrant
status, and mother tongue. These questions were not asked in the 1986
LMAS.
For the sake of comparability with other studies, this paper uses a sample
of men and women aged 20-64 who hold jobs in nonagricultural industries.
This subsample is also restricted to people who have worked for at least four
weeks on a paid, but not self-employed, job in 1986. Jobs with a usual wage
rate of less than $1.00 or more than $75.00 an hour are also excluded from
the sample. A total of 34,765 workers satisfied the various sample selection
criteria.9
6. The LFS sample design is based on six rotation groups including approximately 130,000
people. People remain in the sample for six consecutive months, at which time they are replaced.
7. The definition of a job in the LMAS is Husual duties performed at a usual wage or salary"
(Statistics Canada 1988, sec. 4.1).
8. Statistics Canada managed to reinterview more than 90 percent ofthe people surveyed in the
1986 LMAS, including several thousands who had moved between the two interviews.
9. Of these workers, 32,696 were reinterviewed for the 1987 LMAS. The variables on ethnic
origin, immigrant status, race, and mother tongue are only available for these 32,696 workers.75 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
The V.S. data used to describe the basic empirical regularities on unions
and wages come from the 1986 merged outgoing rotation group file of the
CPS. Both the Canadian and the V.S. data are thus based on earnings supple-
ments to very similar surveys (the LFS and the CPS). The sample selection
criteria used to construct the final V.S. data set are also similar to the ones
used for the Canadian data. 1O A sample of 161,195 workers satisfied these
sample selection criteria. More details on the V.S. data and its comparability
with the LMAS data are provided in appendix A.
3.3.2 Empirical Regularities
As mentioned earlier, the effect of unions on the distribution of wages de-
pends on the joint distribution of unionization rates, union wages, and non-
union wages. This joint distribution is analyzed empirically by first tabulating
unionization rates and wages over a set of workers and jobs characteristics.
Table 3.1 presents the distribution ofthese characteristics in the sample, along
with the unionization rate for workers with these characteristics.
Columns 5 and 6 indicate that the fraction ofworkers covered by collective
bargaining agreements was 45.8 percent among men and 36.4 percent among
women in Canada in 1986. In the LMAS sample, women account for 45.5
percent of the work force and for 39.9 percent of all workers covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, most women holding union jobs
work in the public sector, where the union density is 67.3 percent, as opposed
to 18.9 percent in the private sector. 11 The union density is also higher in the
public sector than in the private sector for men. Overall, 45. 1 percent of Ca-
nadian workers covered by collective bargaining agreements work in the pub-
lic sector.
The composition of the Canadian and u.S. samples reported in table 3.1
are similar with a few exceptions. One difference is the race composition ot
the two samples. There are also some differences in educational achievement
in the two countries, in part because ofdifferences in the questions used in the
two surveys.12 Finally, the public sector employs relatively more people (es-
10. The only sample selection criterion that was not used is the condition that the job must last
at least four weeks Uob duration is not available in the CPS data used). See appendix A for more
details.
11. The definition ofthe public sector used for Canada includes the health and welfare industry
in addition to education services and public administration. This definition is used because the
LMAS does not contain direct information on whether ajob is in the public orin the private sector.
Such information is available, however, in the 1984 Survey of Union Membership. Using these
data, Riddell (chap. 4 in this volume) estimates the private sector density at 29 percent (men and
women together). The definition of the private sector used in this paper would imply a union
density of 28 percent (my calculation using table 2 in Kumar 1988), which is a satisfactory ap-
proximation to the true union density in the private sector.
12. In the LMAS, educational achievement is classified in five categories: none or elementary,
high school (some or completed), some postsecondary, postsecondary certificate or diploma, and
university. These five categories were mapped into the five following ranges ofyears ofschooling
completed in the CPS: 0-7,8-12, 13, 14-15, 16 and more.76 Thomas Lemieux
Table 3.1 Sample Characteristics and Unionization Rates in Canada and the United
States
Sample Composition (%) Unionization Rate (%)
Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total 54.53 45.47 53.49 46.51 45.78 36.39 25.63 16.60
Age
20-24 15.12 18.03 14.27 15.63 26.25 20.25 12.90 7.71
25-34 32.19 33.60 33.80 32.30 43.04 37.71 21.74 14.82
35-44 25.50 25.25 24.96 25.60 51.92 43.30 30.60 19.78
45-54 16.44 15.18 16.15 16.19 54.04 40.72 33.18 21.16
55-64 10.75 7.94 10.82 10.28 54.25 37.24 31.88 20.62
Education
Primary 11.20 7.37 3.30 1.94 57.21 32.17 23.42 15.12
High school 47.38 47.64 50.73 53.54 47.18 30.76 30.94 15.11
More than high
school 10.51 11.35 7.06 8.26 38.38 29.31 27.35 12.15
Some post-
secondary 14.56 18.80 13.87 14.64 42.27 44.12 22.18 11.91
University degree 16.35 14.84 25.03 21.62 41.79 52.22 16.59 25.31
Marital status
Single 28.81 33.20 33.18 42.05 35.93 33.30 20.09 16.00
Married 71.19 66.80 66.82 58.95 49.77 37.93 28.39 17.04
Race
White 93.72 93.69 87.10 85.01 46.78 37.02 24.96 15.37
Nonwhite 6.28 6.31 12.90 14.99 38.74 32.80 30.15 23.57
Part-time status
Full-time 94.46 75.36 93.48 76.41 46.83 38.57 26.58 18.73
Part-time 5.54 24.64 6.52 23.59 27.95 29.73 12.00 9.70
Private sector 80.93 63.87 83.90 79.97 39.21 18.89 21.55 10.19
Public sector 19.07 36.13 16.10 20.03 73.67 67.33 46.93 42.19
Occupation
White-collar 53.20 89.89 54.28 87.66 38.15 36.18 18.40 15.23
Blue-collar 46.80 10.11 45.72 12.34 54.45 38.34 34.22 26.35
Mother tongue
English 59.02 61.50 42.51 34.15
French 26.30 24.70 54.30 45.26
Others 14.68 13.80 47.00 33.10
Sources: Canadian data are from the 1986 cross-sectional file and the 1986-87 longitudinal file of the
LMAS. Sample size is 34,765, except for the tabulations for mother tongue and race, which are based
on a matched sample of 32,696 observations. U.S. data are from the 1986 merged outgoing rotation
group files of the CPS. Sample size is 161,195.
Note: The estimated frequency distributions are all weighted.77 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
pecially women) in Canada, as it is defined to include the health and education
sectors.
Table 3.2 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of standard log
hourly wage equations in which the following regressors are included: an in-
dicator variable for union coverage, the set of worker and job characteristics
listed in table 3.1, and controls for industry, occupation, and region. The es-
timated union wage gap is comparable for men in Canada (0.198) and in the
United States (0.180). It is much larger, however, for women in Canada
(0.287) than for women in the United States (0.156). With the exception of
women in Canada, the estimated union wage gaps reported here are consistent
with previous findings in the literature. 13 The other estimated wage effects are
similar in the two countries except for the effect of part-time employment,
which is much larger in absolute value in the United States. Although the
estimated returns to education are hard to compare for reasons discussed
above, the estimated university-high school wage differentials are similar in
Canada (0.257 for men, 0.271 for women) and in the United States (0.247 for
men, 0.223 for women). 14
The average union wage gaps reported in table 3.2 are estimated under the
implicit assumption that the wage gap is the same for all workers. As men-
tioned in section 3.2, differences in the wage gap aw(x) and in the union den-
sity U(x) by skill groups may play an important role in the overall impact of
unions on the distribution ofwages. The relationships among ~w(x), U(x), and
the nonunion wage wN(x) are examined graphically by fitting simple index
models for these three variables. More specifically, a log wage equation for
the sample of nonunion worker is fit to the set of region dummies, indicator
variables for marriage and race, and fully interacted age and education dum-
mies. The nonunion wage index for a worker with characteristics Xi is then
defined as the predicted wage from that regression (excluding the effect of
province, on the assumption that regional wage differences reflect cost of liv-
ing rather than skill differences). This nonunion wage index can be interpreted
as a general skill index. A similar union wage index is constructed by funning
a wage regression on the sample ofunion workers. The union wage gap for a
13. Results from American studies are surveyed by Lewis (1986). See also Freeman and Medoff
(1984). For Canadian studies that focus on the estimation of the average union wage gap, see
Evans and Clark (1986); Grant, Swidinsky, and Vanderkamp (1987); Kumar and Stengos (1985,
1986); Maki and Ng (1990); Robinson (1989); Robinson and Tomes (1984); and Simpson (1985).
The finding that the union wage gap is larger for women than for men in Canada is at odds with
the results of Maki and Ng (1990) (similar wage gaps for men and women), who used data for
1981. The finding is consistent, however, with the fact that the unadjusted union wage gap was
substantially larger for women than for men in Canada in 1984, 1986, and 1987 (Labour Canada
1991).
14. The estimated returns for education are different from those reported by Freeman and Nee-
dels (chap. 2 in this volume) because ofthe inclusion ofindustry and occupation dummies in the
wage regression.78 Thomas Lemieux
Table 3.2 OLS Estimates ofthe (Log) Wage Equation
Canada u.s.
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covered by collective 0.198 0.287 0.180 0.156
bargaining (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 25-34 0.211 0.180 0.209 0.180
(0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 35-44 0.340 0.221 0.335 0.231
(0.01l) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 45-54 0.372 0.234 0.376 0.231
(0.012) (0.01l) (0.006) (0.005)
Age 55-64 0.332 0.207 0.355 0.226
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
High school 0.138 0.090 0.273 0.252
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.01l)
More than high 0.197 0.148 0.362 0.315
school (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
Some postsecondary 0.267 0.228 0.386 0.366
(0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012)
University degree 0.395 0.361 0.520 0.475
(0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012)
Married 0.111 0.012 0.109 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Nonwhite -0.075 -0.006 -0.093 -0.030
(0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
Part-time -0.124 -0.016 -0.299 -0.169




Not English or -0.027 -0.017
French (0.01l) (0.01l)
Gender dummya -0.262 -0.241
(women = 1) (0.008) (0.002)
Observations 18,679 16,086 84,275 76,920
R2 0.368 0.430 0.415 0.402
Root mean squared
error 0.388 0.372 0.407 0.395
Mean ofdependent
variable 2.422 2.088 2.250 1.906
Sources: Canadian data are from the 1986 cross-sectional file and the 1986-87 longitudinal file
of the LMAS. U.S. data are from the 1986 outgoing rotation group file of the CPS. The depen-
dent variable is the log of the hourly wage rate. All specifications also include region dummies
(ten provinces in Canada, nine regions in the United States), seven industry dummies, and eight
occupation dummies. The base group is age 20-24, primary education, single, white, mother
tongue English (Canada only).
aEstimated from a separate pooled regression for men and women.79 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
given value of the nonunion wage index is simply the difference between the
union and the nonunion wage index. Finally, a union density index is con-
structed by fitting a linear probability model and using the procedure dis-
cussed above to predict the probability ofunion coverage. 15
The predicted union wage gap and the predicted unionization rate are plot-
ted against the nonunion wage index for the sample ofCanadian men in figure
3.1a. The fitted lines in the figure are obtained by regressing the predicted
wage gap and the predicted unionization rate on a third-degree polynomial of
the nonunion wage index. 16 The graph indicates that the union wage gap de-
clines with skill. It is even negative for workers at the high end of the skill
distribution. The graph also indicates that the unionization rate increases with
skill among workers at the low end ofthe skill distribution. The unionization
rate then remains more or less constant for workers at the middle and high
ends ofthe skill distribution.
Figure 3.1a thus suggests that, for men in Canada, unions have a mixed
impact on the distribution ofwages across skill groups. The wage gap for low-
skill men is large, but few of these men are unionized, while the opposite is
true for high-skill men. This patterns hides important differences, however,
between the impact of unions in the private and in the public sector. On the
one hand, Figures 3.1b and 3.1c show that the wage gap declines with skill in
both sectors. On the other hand, the figures show different patterns of union-
ization in the two sectors. While the unionization rate rises steadily to reach
80 percent at the high end ofthe skill distribution in the public sector, it peaks
around 40 percent and then declines with skill in the private sector. Union
workers are thus concentrated in the middle of the skill distribution in the
private sector, but at the high end ofthe skill distribution in the public sector.
The unionization rate is thus high for highly skilled men in Canada because of
the pattern ofthe unionization in the public rather than in the private sector.
Figure 3.1d shows the same plots for men in the United States. Like Cana-
dian union workers in the private sector, union workers in the United States
are concentrated in the middle of the skill distribution. The union wage gap
also declines with skill, though not monotonically, and is negative for workers
at the high end ofthe skill distribution. Unions thus have similar relative wage
effects in Canada and in the United States. Union workers are more skilled in
Canada than in the United States, however, because ofthe high level ofunion-
ization among public sector workers.
Figure 3.2 shows analogous plots for women. These figures suggest two
15. Since age and education dummies are fully interacted, the predicted probabilities from a
linear probability model are almost identical to the predicted probabilities from a probit or logit
model (they would be numerically equivalent ifall the regressors were fully interacted).
16. Only the fitted values (from a cubic regression) ofthe union wage gap and ofthe unioniza-
tion rates, as opposed to the predicted values of these variables for each age-education-race-
marital status cell, are plotted to simplify the graphs.80 Thomas Lemieux
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Fig.3.1 Predicted union wage gap and predicted unionization rate by skill
level: men
Note: Fitted values from a cubic regression ofthe predicted union wage gap (or unionization
rate) on the predicted nonunion wage by age-education-race-marital status cell (see text for
details).
major differences in the patterns ofunionization and wages between men and
women. First, the predicted union wage gap declines much less with skill for
women than for men. The predicted union wage gap is always at least half as
large for women at the high end of the skill distribution as for women at the
low end ofthe skill distribution. It is almost a flat function ofskills for women
in Canada when private and public sector workers are pooled (figure 3.2a). A
second major difference between men and women is that, for women, union-
ization is concentrated at the high end ofthe skill distribution in both Canada
and the United States. The breakdown between the private and the public sec-
tor in Canada (figures 3.2b and 3.2c) suggests this overall pattern is due to
concentration ofunion jobs in the public sector.
The division of union jobs between the public and the private sectors thus
goes a long way toward explaining the patterns of unionization along skill
lines for men and women in Canada and the United States. The fraction of
union workers who hold a public sector job is 29 percent for U.S. men, 31
percent for Canadian men, 51 percent for U.S. women, and 67 percent for
Canadian women. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that, as this fraction increases,81 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
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Fig.3.2 Predicted union wage gap and predicted unionization rate by skill
level: women
Note: Fitted values from a cubic regression of the predicted union wage gap (or unionization
rate) on the predicted nonunion wage by age-education-race-marital status cell (see text for
details).
the distribution ofunionization gets more and more skewed to the right ofthe
skill distribution.
The other main conclusion to be drawn from figures 3.1 and 3.2 is that the
union wage gap declines in the skill level. This negative relationship is
stronger for men than for women. The same basic conclusions are reached
using a more standard regression-based approach for Canada (see appendix
table 3B.l). Appendix table 3B.2 summarizes the results of that regression-
based approach by showing the effects ofunions on a selected number ofwage
differentials such as the university-high school wage differential and the
white-collar/blue-collar wage differential.
3.4 Fixed Effect Estimation
The descriptive analysis of section 3.3 indicates substantial diversity in the
role of unions for various subgroups of the work force. This section presents
detailed estimates ofthe effects ofunions on both the level and the variance of
wages for some of these subgroups. These estimates will be used in section82 Thomas Lemieux
3.5 to calculate the overall impact ofunions on wage inequality. This section
first discusses the importance of adjusting these estimates for the self-
selection ofworkers into the union sectorfor each subgroup ofthe work force.
The actual estimates are reported later in the section.
3.4.1 Self-selection and the Fixed Effects Method
The pattern of the union wage gap along skill lines documented in section
3.3 raises the question of whether the estimated gaps represent "true" effects
ofunionism on wage or merely reflect the selection of workers into the union
sector on the basis of their unobserved productive characteristics. For in-
stance, it may be that, among workers with low observed skills, only the most
qualified are hired by unionized employers. It may also be that most workers
with high observed skills do not get many benefits for joining unions, so only
those with low unobserved skills join unions. As a result, union workers
might be positively selected at the low end of the observed skill distribution
but negatively selected at the high end ofthe observed skill distribution. This
pattern of selection would arise from a model in which (1) unions compress
the distribution ofwages across skill groups, (2) workers who get the highest
wage premium are the most likely to want to join unions, and (3) employers
would rather hire workers for which the wage premium is the lowest. 17 In this
model, union employers do not want to hire low-skill workers as they com-
mand a high wage premium, while high-skill workers do not want union jobs
because their wage gain from unionization is low or negative. Unionization is
thus concentrated among workers in the middle ofthe skill distribution. Since
total skills are the sum ofobserved and unobserved skills, union workers with
low observed skills tend to have high unobserved skills (positive selection)
and vice versa. This model thus generates a pattern of selection that could
explain why the estimated wage gap declines with skill.
The fixed effect approach is a standard technique used to consistently esti-
mate the effects of union on wages when workers are selected in the union
sector on the basis of unobservable characteristics. I8 The approach has the
advantage of being robust to the complicated pattern of selection mentioned
above. The goal ofthis section is thus to consistently estimate the union wage
gap dw(x) and the union variance gap dv(x) by exploiting the panel data aspect
of the LMAS and of the (matched) CPS data. Several recent U.S. studies,
including Card (1992), have used fixed effect methods with the CPS data to
estimate the effects of unions on wages. Since Card also addresses measure-
17. These are the building blocks of the queuing model of unionization of Abowd and Farber
(1982).
18. See, for example, Chamberlain (1982) and Freeman (1984), who use various versions of
the fixed effect approach to estimate the average union wage gap in the United States. There is a
large debate on whether or not the fixed effect approach appropriately adjusts the wage gap esti-
mates for the selection of union workers. Lemieux (1992) discusses these issues in detail. The
results reported there suggest that fixed effect estimates adjust for most ofthe selection bias.83 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
ment issues specific to the matched CPS data that are beyond the scope ofthis
paper (see appendix A), his results will be directly used here and compared to
the results obtained using the LMAS data.
One shortcoming of the fixed effect approach is that, in the LMAS data, it
is only applicable to the limited sample ofworkers who changed jobs at least
once during the 1986-87 period. This reduces the precision of the estimates
and limits the ability to measure the effect of unions for small subgroups of
the work force. It is thus important to use a parsimonious approach to get
precise enough estimates while still letting the effect ofunions vary along the
lines suggested in section 3.3. In light of the results in section 3.3, it was
decided to analyze men and women separately and to further break down the
data into workers in the public and private sectors. It is also important to allow
for some heterogeneity in the effect of unions by skill level. For the sake of
comparability with the study ofCard (1992) for the United States, the sample
will thus be divided into three skill group (tiers) on the basis of workers'
predicted wage in the nonunion sector. 19
3.4.2 Dividing the Sample in Three Tiers
The sample ofmen and the sample ofwomen are divided into three tiers by
first fitting log wages to a regression ofprovince, language, race, and marital
status dummies, and age and education dummies fully interacted. A predicted
nonunion wage is then constructed from all these variables except the prov-
ince dummies (see section 3.3.2). This predicted wage is used to separate
workers into three skill groups (lower tier, middle tier, and upper tier) of ap-
proximately equal sizes. 20
Table 3.3 reports average nonunion wages, union wages, and unionization
rates for the three tiers ofthe sample ofCanadian men (columns 1-3). It also
presents OLS estimates ofthe average union wage gap for each tier. The OLS
estimates reported in column 4 are obtained by regressing log hourly wages
on a dummy variable for union coverage, province and marital status dum-
mies, age and education dummies fully interacted, and an extensive set ofjob
characteristics available in the LMAS data.
21 Table 3.4 reports analogous es-
timates for the sample ofCanadian women.
19. Card (1992) uses the large samples ofthe 1987-88 matched files ofthe CPS and divides his
sample ofmen aged 24-66 in five quintiles. The Canadian sample is divided in three tiers only to
improve the precision of the estimates (the Canadian sample is much smaller than the U.S.
sample).
20. Dividing the sample in three tiers is simply one method among others to let the effects of
unions vary over workers with different skill levels. A different but related method is used by
Simpson (1985), who divides workers on the basis ofthe skill requirements ofthe occupation they
hold. In addition, since workers are divided into tiers on the basis ofa predicted wage, estimates
by tier are not biased, while they would be ifworkers were divided into tiers on the basis oftheir
actual wage (the dependent variable).
21. These job characteristics include a part-time dummy, seven occupation dummies, three
tenure dummies, and four firm-size dummies.84 Thomas Lemieux
Table 3.3 OLS and First-Differenced Wage Gap Estimates by Tier for Men in Canada
Wage Gap Estimatesa
Nonunion Union Unionization First- Selection
Wage Wage Rate OLS Differenced Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public and private pooled
Tier 1 2.010 2.407 38.2 0.232 0.207 0.025
(0.011) (0.035)
Tier 2 2.312 2.534 50.3 0.129 0.220 -0.091
(0.011) (0.038)
Tier 3 2.597 2.713 50.5 0.044 0.006 0.038
(0.013) (0.059)
All 2.305 2.550 46.3 0.133 0.163 -0.030
(0.007) (0.024)
Private sector only
Tier 1 2.016 2.417 34.9 0.223 0.190 0.033
(0.012) (0.038)
Tier 2 2.309 2.547 45.8 0.131 0.229 -0.098
(0.012) (0.040)
Tier 3 2.577 2.678 35.9 0.049 0.076 -0.027
(0.017) (0.088)
All 2.300 2.547 39.1 0.139 0.162 -0.023
(0.008) (0.026)
Public sector only
Tier 1 1.950 2.366 59.2 0.308 0.302 0.006
(0.033) (0.084)
Tier 2 2.346 2.488 76.6 0.106 0.161 -0.055
(0.029) (0.101)
Tier 3 2.703 2.743 77.6 0.028 0.074 -0.046
(0.022) (0.092)
All 2.332 2.532 73.6 0.111 0.166 -0.055
(0.015) (0.050)
Notes: Based on 18,679 observations (14,773 in the private sector, 3,906 in the public sector) divided
into tiers on the basis of the predicted nonunion wage (see text). The public sector accounts for 13.5
percent ofemployment in tier 1, 14.6 percent in tier 2, and 20.9 percent in tier 3.
aBoth OLS and first-differenced estimates are obtained by fitting log hourly wage regressions that also
include controls for age, education, marital status, part-time status, tenure, firm size, industry, and
occupation. The first-differenced estimates are based on a sample of 1,559 involuntary job changers (744
in tier 1, 480 in tier 2, and 335 in tier 3).
The results show the same patterns that were observed in figures 3.1 and
3.2. In the case of men, the union wage gap declines in the skill level while
the unionization rate first increases and then remains constant in the middle
and upper tiers. The results for women indicate that the union wage gap
slowly declines in the skill level. For both men and women, public sector
unionization increases in the skills of workers, while private sector unioniza-85 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
Table 3.4 OLS and First-Differenced Wage Gap Estimates by Tier for Women in
Canada
Wage Gap Estimatesa
Nonunion Union Unionization First- Selection
Wage Wage Rate OLS Differenced Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public and private pooled
Tier 1 1.748 2.150 27.0 0.229 0.190 0.039
(0.012) (0.037)
Tier 2 1.904 2.273 33.6 0.230 0.077 0.153
(0.013) (0.051)
Tier 3 2.165 2.538 53.4 0.178 0.191 -0.013
(0.015) (0.054)
All 1.934 2.319 37.9 0.212 0.167 0.045
(0.008) (0.026)
Private sector only
Tier 1 1.736 2.078 17.3 0.200 0.146 0.054
(0.015) (0.045)
Tier 2 1.889 2.241 19.8 0.231 0.152 0.079
(0.017) (0.066)
Tier 3 2.103 2.391 17.0 0.170 0.320 -0.150
(0.027) (0.107)
All 1.908 2.236 18.2 0.206 0.186 0.020
(0.011) (0.037)
Public sector only
Tier 1 1.814 2.217 56.4 0.299 0.267 0.032
(0.024) (0.058)
Tier 2 1.987 2.296 65.1 0.246 -0.022 0.268
(0.020) (0.074)
Tier 3 2.288 2.558 75.0 0.187 0.153 0.034
(0.017) (0.108)
All 2.028 2.355 68.4 0.231 0.150 0.081
(0.011) (0.035)
Notes: Based on 16,086 observations (9,788 in the private sector, 6,298 in the public sector) divided into
tiers on the basis ofthe predicted nonunion wage (see text). The public sector accounts for 24.8 percent
ofemployment in tier 1, 30.4 percent in tier 2, and 62.8 percent in tier 3.
aBoth OLS and first-differenced estimates are obtained by fitting log hourly wage regressions that also
include controls for age, education, marital status, part-time status, tenure, firm size, industry, and
occupation. The first-differenced estimates are based on a sample of 1,268 involuntary job changers (552
in tier 1, 362 in tier 2, and 354 in tier 3).
tion is concentrated in the middle of the skill distribution. The average union
wage gaps are similar in the public and in the private sector.
3.4.3 Longitudinal Data for Fixed Effect Estimation
A data set like the LMAS, containing detailed information on work histo-
ries ofindividuals, has several advantages over standard panel data sets, such86 Thomas Lemieux
as matched CPS's, for estimating the union wage gap by fixed effect methods.
A first advantage is that it is known from the work history whether a worker
changed jobs. This information reduces the odds ofmisclassification errors in
recorded changes in the union status, since union status changes only for job
changers. Intuitively, observing a change in union status is not surprising
when it is known that the worker has changed jobs. By contrast, observing a
change in union status is surprising for a worker who has not changed jobs.22
The probability that a recorded union status change for a non-job changer is
due to misclassification errors is thus high. Since true job changes are infre-
quent events, a large number ofthe recorded changes in union status are likely
to be spurious when job movers and job stayers are pooled. This problem is
avoided by limiting the longitudinal analysis to workers who are known to
have changedjobs.23
A second advantage of the LMAS is that it records the reason a worker
changed jobs. It is thus possible to separate workers who quit their jobs vol-
untarily from workers who did not. In the presence ofendogenous job search,
fixed effect estimates based on a sample of voluntary quitters are likely to be
biased. It is thus useful to estimate the model separately for involuntary job
changers to see whether the results are robust to the choice ofsample.
To be classified as a job changer, a worker has to hold consecutive jobs for
two different employers over the 1986-87 period. The job changer also has to
work at least four weeks on each of these jobs. On the one hand, workers
holding two jobs simultaneously for more than a week are not classified as job
changers. On the other hand, workers who are recorded to hold two jobs si-
multaneously during the transition week are also classified as job changers, to
account for the possibility of job changes during the transition week as op-
posed to over the weekend. Finally, job changers are divided into a sample of
voluntary quitters and involuntary changers on the basis of their response to
the question, "What was the main reason . . . left that job or business?" 24 A
sample of 5,200 job changers, including 2,826 involuntary changers and
2,374 voluntary quitters, were selected on the basis of their answer to that
question. A panel oftwo jobs is available for both type o~job changers.
3.4.4 Fixed Effect Estimates by Tier
The fixed effect estimates of the union wage gap are reported in column 5
of tables 3.3 and 3.4. The estimates are obtained by fitting to the sample of
involuntary job changers a first-differenced version ofthe regressions used to
22. True transitions would only occur when the job became organized ordecertified, which is a
very unlikely event.
23. See Krueger and Summers (1988) for some evidence on this point in the context ofestimat-
ing interindustry wage differentials.
24. Voluntary quitters left theirjob for one ofthe following reasons: low pay, no opportunity of
advancement, no opportunity to use training orskills, working conditions, otherreasons for which
they were dissatisfied, or a decision to quit for no particularreason.87 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
compute the OLS wage gaps (column 4). The first-differenced regressions
also include a dummy variable indicating whether the secondjob was recorded
in the 1987 LMAS, as opposed to the 1986 LMAS, to account for growth in
log wages between 1986 and 1987. To improve the precision of the results,
the first-differenced wage gap estimates in the private and public sectors are
obtained by fitting a regression for the pooled sample in which the union cov-
erage variable is interacted with a public sector dummy (a public sector
dummy is also included separately). Note that, since there are only two obser-
vations per worker, first-differenced estimates are equivalent to standard
within estimates.
The first-differenced wage gap estimates for men reported in table 3.3 are
always larger than the OLS estimates when the three tiers are pooled. On
average, men holding union jobs are thus negatively selected in both the pri-
vate and the public sectors. The selection bias (the difference between the
OLS and the first-differenced wage gap estimates) is reported in column 6.
There is also some evidence that men in the lower tier are positively selected,
while men in the middle and upper tiers are negatively selected in both private
and public sector union jobs. It is nevertheless clear that the selection-adjusted
wage gaps decline with skill. The selection mechanism only accentuates this
pattern.
The results reported in table 3.4 indicate that, unlike men, women holding
union jobs are positively selected in both the public and the private sector. As
in the case of men, the selection is negative for lower-tier women and for
upper-tier women working in the public sector. Unlike men, however, middle-
tier women and upper-tier women in the private sector are positively selected
into the union sector. Overall, the selection-adjusted estimates reinforce the
conclusion that there is little systematic relationship between the union wage
gap and the skill level ofwomen in Canada.
The differences in the pattern ofwage differentials for men and women can
be restated in terms ofselection-adjusted returns to skills in the union and the
nonunion sectors. These returns to skills are calculated as the difference
between the predicted wage of an average worker in the upper tier and the
predicted wage of an average worker in the lower tier. These predicted
wages wN(G) and WU(G) for tier G are defined as wN(G) = w(G)
- U(G)~w(G) and WU(G) = WN(G) + ~w(G), where w(G) is the average wage
in tier G, U(G) is the unionization rate, and Llw(G) is the first-differenced wage
gap estimate. Applying these formulas to the estimates reported in tables 3.3
and 3.4 yields an estimated return to skill for men of .37 in the union sector,
and of .57 in the nonunion sector. The estimated return to skill is equal to .46
for women in both the union and the nonunion sector.
The union wage gap is thus the same for lower-tier and upper-tier women
because the returns to skills for women are lower in the nonunion sector and
higher in the union sector. Relative to men, the skills ofwomen are thus more
rewarded in the union than in the nonunion sector. This explains why high-88 Thomas Lemieux
skill women are relatively more likely than high-skill men to select the union
sector. This pattern ofself-selection is even stronger in the public sector, sug-
gesting that public sector unions play a very different role for men than they
do for women. Controlling for observables, unionizedjobs in the public sector
seem to attract relatively skilled women and relatively unskilled men. A po-
tentially fruitful area ofresearch would be to explore how differences in both
wages and benefits packages, such as maternity leaves, make unionized public
sectorjobs particularly attractive to high-skill women.
The validity of these findings relies heavily, however, on the assumption
that first-differenced wage gap estimates for the sample of involuntary job
changers are consistent estimates ofthe true wage gap. Since first-differenced
wage gap estimates are overidentified, it is possible to perform specification
tests of these estimates. One straightforward test is to compare the wage gap
estimates for union joiners and union leavers. These two wage gaps are esti-
mated by interacting the union coverage variable with a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the worker is a union joiner or a union leaver, and then fitting
a first-differenced version ofthat enlarged wage equation.
The wage gap estimates for union joiners and union leavers are reported in
columns 2 and 3 of appendix table 3C.l. The wage gap estimates for joiners
and leavers are very similar, especially for men, which suggests the first-
differenced model for the sample ofinvoluntary leavers is well specified. The
table also shows additional evidence of robustness of the main findings by
presenting estimates for the sample of all job changers and for a sample of
dual-job holders.
Most ofthe results presented in table 3C.l are more directly comparable to
the results ofCard (1992), as they include demographic and location charac-
teristics but not job characteristics in the wage equations being fitted. 25 Figure
3.3 compares the pattern of the union wage gap and of the unionization rate
for men in Canada and the United States. The Canadian wage gap estimates
are taken from column 1 of table 3C. 1. The U.S. wage gap estimates are
Card's (1992) wage gap estimates by quintile averaged in three tiers. The fig-
ure indicates similar patterns of selection-adjusted wage differentials in the
two countries. The figure also indicates the unionization rates in the two coun-
tries diverge at the high end ofthe skill distribution, as was discussed in sec-
tion 3.3. Note also that Card finds no evidence of selection bias, on average.
He finds some evidence of positive selection at the lower end and negative
selection at the upper end of the skill distribution, but the two effects cancel
out in the aggregate.
3.4.5 Estimates ofthe Union Variance Gap in Canada
Of the main components of equations (6), (7'), and (8), only the variance
gap av(x) remains to be estimated. One estimator of the variance gap is the
25. The covariates used are thus the regressors used in the predicted nonunion wage equation









Fig.3.3 Union wage effects and unionization rates by predicted wage tier for
men in Canada and the United States
Sources: Rows I, 4, and 5 of tables 3.6 and 3.8.
difference between the cross-sectional variance of wages in the union and in
the nonunion sector. One problem with that approach is that it fails to distin-
guish whether unions reduce the variance ofwages from whether union work-
ers are more homogeneous than nonunion workers (Freeman 1984). This
cross-sectional estimator is thus potentially afflicted by selectivity biases. One
alternative panel data estimator of the variance gap that is not afflicted by
selectivity biases is obtained by contrasting the change in the variance of
wages of union joiners to the change in the variance of wages of nonunion
stayers:
(V~I - V?I) - (V~ - Vr),
where V~k is the variance of wages on job t (t = 1,2) among workers with
union history Vii = j and V i2 = k. Another estimator is obtained by compar-
ing union leavers to union stayers:
- [(V~O - V~O) - (V~I - V~I)].
Both ofthese estimators ofthe variance gap are consistent but inefficient. The
efficient longitudinal estimator of the variance gap is obtained by fitting a90 Thomas Lemieux
weighted linear regression of the change in union status (0,1, - 1,0) to the
change in the variance of wages (V~ - Vr>, V~l - V?l, V~o - V~o, V~l -
V ~ 1) for the four union histories. Although this longitudinal estimator has
clear advantages over the cross-sectional estimator, it may still be biased ifthe
sample ofjob changers is small and unrepresentative. Both the cross-sectional
and the longitudinal variance gap estimates are thus potentially biased. Both
estimates will be presented below.
Changes in the variance of wages, V~k - V~\ for each of the four union
histories 00, 01, 10, and 11 are reported in columns 1-4 of table 3.5. The
efficient longitudinal estimate of the variance gap is reported in column 5,
while the difference in cross-sectional variances is reported in column 6. The
results for men indicate that the variance of wages of union joiners (01) de-
creases when they join the union sector, while the variance ofwages ofunion
leavers (10) increases after they leave the union sector. The estimated variance
gap is - 0.50 for the whole sample of men, which is smaller than the cross-
sectional estimate of - O. 134. In addition, the estimated union effect is larger
(in absolute value) for upper-tier than for lower-tier workers. For women, the
longitudinal variance gap estimate (-0.029) is also smaller than the cross-
sectional variance gap estimate (- 0.064).
On the one hand, these results reject the view that the variance ofwages is
lower in the union than in the nonunion sector simply because union workers
are more homogeneous than nonunion workers. On the other hand, the longi-
tudinal estimates of the variance gap are less than half of the cross-sectional
variance gaps. 26 Correcting for selection biases thus has a bigger impact on
the variance gap estimates than on the wage gap estimates reported in tables
3.3 and 3.4. There is some evidence, however, that part of the discrepancy
between the cross-sectional and the longitudinal estimates ofthe variance gap
is due to the composition of the sample of involuntary job changers. While
the cross-sectional estimates ofthe variance gap are equal to -.134 for men
and - .064 for women in the full sample, they are equal to only - .077 and
.033 in the sample of involuntary changers. Furthermore, the preferred esti-
mate of the variance gap in Lemieux (1992) is closer to the cross-sectional
variance gap for the full sample than to the longitudinal variance gap for the
sample of involuntary changers. 27 The cross-sectional estimates of the vari-
ance gap (table 3.5, column 6) will thus be used to calculate the overall impact
ofunions on the variance ofwages.
The estimated variance gaps for men in Canada and the United States are
26. This was also noted by Swidinsky and Kupferschmidt (1991).
27. Lemieux (1992) also finds that the composition of the sample of involuntary job changers
does not significantly affect the longitudinal estimates of the union wage gap (effect on level of
wages). The composition problem occurs because unions flatten the returns to the permanent
component of unobservable characteristics and the dispersion of these unobservable characteris-
tics is small among job changers. The flattening effect thus reduces the variance of wages ofjob
changers by less than it reduces the variance ofwages ofall union workers.91 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
Table 3.5 Change in Variance ofWages for Job Changers in Canada
Change in Variance Estimates ofthe
by Union History Union Variance Gap
00 01 10 11 Longitudinala Cross-sectional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Men
Public and private sectors
Tier 1 -0.020 0.009 0.039 0.007 -0.018 -0.052
Tier 2 -0.009 -0.033 0.034 0.029 -0.033 -0.088
Tier 3 0.003 -0.027 0.078 -0.025 -0.057 -0.136
All tiers -0.011 -0.019 0.074 0.007 -0.050 -0.134
Private sector only
All tiers -0.001 -0.004 0.040 -0.004 -0.024 -0.134
Public sector only
All tiers -0.107 -0.123 0.210 0.059 -0.181 -0.208
B. Women
Public and private sectors
Tier 1 -0.018 -0.047 0.036 -0.068 -0.042 -0.037
Tier 2 0.031 -0.040 0.049 0.042 -0.044 -0.094
Tier 3 -0.001 -0.122 -0.063 -0.092 -0.024 -0.097
All tiers -0.002 -0.051 0.008 -0.064 -0.029 -0.064
Private sector only
All tiers -0.005 0.038 0.006 -0.063 0.019 -0.054
Public sector only
All tiers 0.010 -0.180 0.005 -0.075 -0.071 -0.133
aEstimated by fitting a weighted linear regression of the change in union status to the change in variance
of wages for the four union histories. See text for more details.
compared in figure 3.3 (the estimates for the United States are in row 5 of
table 3.8). As in the case ofthe wage gap, the estimated variance gaps follow
similar patterns in Canada and in the United States. In both countries, the
estimated variance gaps tend to be larger for high-skill men than for low-skill
men.
3.5 The Overall Impact ofUnions on Wage Inequality
This section uses the fixed effect, or selection-adjusted, estimates to calcu-
late the impact of unions on the overall variance of wages. Following the
discussion in section 3.2, the effect ofunions on the overall variance ofwages
can be divided in three parts: (1) the effect of unions on the relative position
of each skill group in the wage distribution; (2) the effect of unions on the
between-sector variance ofwages in a skill group, averaged over skill groups;
and (3) the effect of unions on the within-sector variance of wages in a skill
group, averaged over skill groups. The formulas (6), (7'), and (8) can be thus92 Thomas Lemieux
be used directly to compute these effects by replacing the general skill cate-
gories x by an index G for the three tiers defined above (G = lower tier,
middle tier, and upper tier). These formulas depend on the nonunion wage
wV(G), the unionization rate U(G), the union wage gap dw(G), the union vari-
ance gap dv(G), and the unadjusted wage gap ~w(G). For Canada, estimates
of U(x), dw(x), dix), and ~w(x) are available from tables 3.3-3.5 and 3C.1,
while wV(G) is obtained from the formula wV(G) = w(G) - U(G)dw(G)
(w(G) is the average wage in the tier).
The calculations ofthe overall impact ofunions on the variance ofwages in
Canada are reported in table 3.6 for men and in table 3.7 for women. For both
men and women, the effect of unions on the within-sector variance of wages
(row 6) is smaller than the effect of unions on the between-sector variance
(row 7) in the lower tier. The reverse holds in the middle tier and the upper
tier. Unions thus reduce the within-tier variance of wages by 0.029 for men
and by 0.003 for women (row 8). In the case of men, unions also reduce the
between-tier (across skill groups) variance of wages by 0.011 (row 9). The
total impact of unions on the variance of wages is thus equal to - 0.040,
which represents a 14.5 percent reduction in the overall variance ofwages.
As mentioned before, the impact of unions on the relative position of the
Table 3.6 Effects ofUnions on Wage Inequality: Men in Canada
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 All
1. Unionization rate (UG ) 38.2 40.3 50.5 46.3
2. Mean log wage
Nonunion 2.010 2.312 2.597 2.305
Union 2.407 2.534 2.713 2.550
Unadjusted wage gap (~wG) 0.397 0.222 0.116 0.245
3. Standard deviation of log wages
Nonunion 0.436 0.448 0.532 0.530
Union 0.371 0.335 0.383 0.383
4. Estimated union wage gap 0.242 0.248 0.064
(dwG, table 3C.1, col. 1)
5. Estimated union variance gap -0.052 -0.088 -0.136
(dvG , table 3.5, col. 6)
Effect ofunions on within-tier variance
6. Effect on within-sector variance -0.020 -0.044 -0.069 -0.044
(row 1) * (row 5)
7. Effect on between-sector variance 0.032 0.012 0.003 0.015
(UG (1 - UG)[~ - (dwG - d wG)2])
8. Total effect 0.012 -0.032 -0.066 -0.029
(row 6 + row 7)
Effect of unions on between-tier variance
9. (VarG(UGdwG) + 2CovG(~,UGdwG» -0.011
Total effect on variance of wages
10. (row 8 + row 9) -0.04093 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
Table 3.7 Effects ofUnions on Wage Inequality: Women in Canada
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 All
1. Unionization rate (UG) 27.0 33.6 53.4 26.4
2. Mean log wage
Nonunion 1.748 1.904 2.165 1.934
Union 2.150 2.273 2.548 2.319
Unadjusted wage gap (jMi) 0.402 0.369 0.373 0.375
3. Standard deviation oflog wages
Nonunion 0.395 0.437 0.496 0.466
Union 0.345 0.312 0.386 0.392
4. Estimated union wage gap 0.245 0.205 0.264
(dMi, table 3C.l, col. 1)
5. Estimated union variance gap -0.037 -0.094 -0.097
(dMi, table 3.5, col. 6)
Effect ofunions on within-tier variance
6. Effect on within-sector variance -0.010 -0.032 -0.052 -0.031
(row 1) * (row 5)
7. Effect on between-sector variance 0.027 0.024 0.031 0.028
(UGO - UG)[~ - (dMi - d Mi)2])
8. Total effect 0.017 -0.008 -0.021 -0.003
(row 6 + row 7)
Effect ofunions on between-tier variance
9. (VarG(UGdwa) + 2CovG(w~,UGdMi)) 0.013
Total effect on variance ofwages
10. (row 8 + row 9) 0.009
tiers in the overall wage distribution is very different for men and women. For
women, the union wage gap is more or less stable across tiers, and upper-tier
women are disproportionately represented in the union sector. As a result,
unions worsen the relative position of lower-tier women and increase the
between-tier variance of wages by 0.013 (table 3.7, row 9). Overall, unions
thus increase the variance ofwages among women by 0.009, which represent
4.1 percent of the overall variance of wages. The finding that unions reduce
the variance ofwages ofmen but increase the variance ofwages ofwomen is
robust to the choice ofestimator ofthe variance gap. Iflongitudinal estimates
of the variance gap were used instead of cross-sectional estimates, the esti-
mated effect of unions on the variance of wages would become -0.013 (in-
stead of - 0.040) for men and 0.022 (instead of0.009) for women.
The estimates can also be used to compute the overall effect of unions on
the variance of wages of Canadian men and women pooled together. This
effect depends on (1) the effect ofunions on the variance ofwages within men
and within women, and (2) the effect of unions on the wage differential be-
tween men and women. The first component ofthe overall effect is simply the
weighted sum of the effects reported in row 10 of tables 3.6 and 3.7. It is94 Thomas Lemieux
equal to - 0.017, which represents a 6.1 percent reduction in the variance of
wages. The second, or "between," component is given by
where sm and Sw are the proportion ofmen and women in the work force, and
W is the average wage for men and women. This component is equal to
- 0.002, which indicates that unions slightly improve the position of women
relative to men in the wage distribution. Overall, unions thus reduce the vari-
ance ofwages for Canadian men and women by 0.019 (0.017 plus 0.002).
Finally, the results for men in the United States are reported in table 3.8.
These results are obtained by transforming the estimates reported in table 8 of
Card (1992) by quintiles into estimates by tier. The relationship between the
estimates by tier (T1 to T3) and the estimates by quintile (Ql to Q5) is given
by the weighted averages Tl = .6Ql + .4Q2, T2 = .2Q2 + .6Q3 +
.2Q4, and T3 = .4Q4 + .6Q5. As in the case of men in Canada, the effect
of unions on the within-sector variance (- 0.020) is larger than the effect on
the between-sector variance (0.009). Unions thus reduce the average within-
Table 3.8 Effects of Unions on Wage Inequality: Men in the United States
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
I. Unionization rate (UG) 26.2 30.9 21.7
2. Mean log wage
Nonunion 1.973 2.276 2.636
Union - 2.325 2.480 2.602
Unadjusted wage gap (~"G) 0.352 0.204 -0.034
3. Standard deviation of log wages
Nonunion 0.446 0.483 0.523
Union 0.362 0.342 0.362
4. Estimated union wage gap 0.232 0.142 0.067
5. Estimated union variance gap -0.075 -0.038 -0.142
Effect ofunions on within-tier variance
6. Effect on within-sector variance -0.019 -0.010 -0.031
(row 1) * (row 5)
7. Effect on between-sector variance 0.021 0.009 -0.003
(UG(l - UG)[~ - (~KG - ~KG)2])
8. Total effect 0.002 -0.000 -0.034
(row 6 + row 7)
Effect of unions on between-tier variance
9. (VarG(UG~K'G) + 2CovG(W~,UG~KG))
Total effect on variance of wages













Notes: The estimates were obtained by transforming the estimates reported in Card (1992) by quintiles
into three tiers. The relationship between the estimates by tier (TI to T3) and the estimates by quintile
(QI to Q5) is given by the following weighted averages: TI = .6Ql + .4Q2, T2 = .2Q2 + .6Q3 +
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tier variance ofwages by 0.011. Unions also reduce the between-tier variance
ofwages by 0.008, for a total effect of - 0.019, or 6.3 percent of the overall
variance ofwages.
3.6 Unions and Relative Wage Inequality in Canada and the
United States
The results reported in table 3.8 indicate that unions reduce the variance of
men's wages in the United States by 0.019, which is half of the estimated
effect for Canada (0.040, table 3.6). The difference is mostly attributable to
the larger effect of unions on the within-tier variance in Canada than in the
United States. Authors such as Freeman (1991) and Card (1992) have argued
that a significant fraction of the increase in wage inequality in the United
States over the last two decades is attributable to the decline of unionism in
the United States. Does the Canadian evidence support the view that wage
inequality among men would be lower in the United States ifAmerican unions
were "as strong" as Canadian unions? To answer this question, consider what
would happen to wage inequality in the United States if the Canadian, as op-
posed to the U.S., distribution of unionism was to prevail, holding constant
the U.S. wage structure. Alternatively, consider what would happen to wage
inequality in Canada if the U.S., as opposed to the Canadian, distribution of
unionism was to prevail, holding constant the Canadian wage structure. The
results ofthese experiments are reported in table 3.9.
The first row oftable 3.9 indicates that there is a gap of0.050 between the
actual variance of wages of men in Canada and in the United States. Row 4
indicates that ifthe extent ofunionization in the United States were the same
as in Canada, this gap would be reduced to 0.030. The gap would also be
reduced to 0.030 if the extent of unionization in Canada was the same as in
the United States (row 3). It would be reduced to 0.029 ifthere were no unions
in either Canada or the United States (row 2). Taken together, these results
suggest that differences in the pattern and extent of unionism in Canada and
in the United States explain 40 percent ofthe difference in wage inequality of
men between the two countries.
The results reported in column 1 also indicate that the variance ofwages of
Canadian women, unlike men, would be essentially unchanged if the union-
ization rate was the same as in the United States. This result is consistent with
the overall finding that unions have a small, though positive, effect on the
variance ofwages ofwomen.
The evidence from the Canada-U.S. comparison for men thus yields similar
conclusions to the longitudinal comparison between the United States in the
1970s and in the late 1980s (Card 1992, and Freeman 1991). These studies
find that deunionization in the United States between 1973 (or 1978) and 1987
accounts for 20 percent of the increase in wage inequality over that period.
The unionization rate was relatively constant in Canada over the same period.96 Thomas Lemieux





Canada Canada V.S. and Canada
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Actual variance of wages 0.228 0.234 0.284 0.050
2. Variance of wages that
would prevail in the ab-
sence of unionsa 0.219 0.274 0.303 0.029
3. Variance of wages that
would prevail with V.S.
unionism
b 0.226 0.254 0.284 0.030
4. Variance of wages that
would prevail with Cana-
dian unionismc 0.228 0.234 0.264 0.030
aActual variance of wages minus the estimated effect of unions on the variance of wages (tables
3.6-3.8, row 10).
bActual variance of wages minus the effect of unions on the variance of wages calculated by
replacing the actual unionization rates by the V.S. unionization rates in row 1 of table 3.5. The
V.S. unionization rates for women are calculated from the 1986 CPS data used in tables 3. 1 and
3.2 (11.7 percent in the lower tier, 15.4 percent in the middle tier, and 20. 1percent in the upper
tier).
cActual variance of wages minus the effect of unions on the variance of wages calculated by
replacing the actual unionization rates by the Canadian unionization rates in row 1of table 3.6.
Can changes in unionization rates between Canada and the United States ex-
plain the finding by Blackburn and Bloom (chap. 7 in this volume) that in-
equality in earnings increased by 0.034 in the United States but only by 0.018
in Canada over the 1979 to 1986 period? Although this paper does not provide
direct evidence on that question, some back-of-the-envelope calculations can
be made by combining some results from Riddell (chap. 4 in this volume)
with the main findings ofthis paper. Table 4.1 in Riddell shows that the U.S.
union density fell by 6 points relative to the Canadian density from 1980 to
1986. These 6 points represent a third ofthe gap in unionization rates between
the two countries in 1986. Since the gap in unionization rates explains 0.020
of the gap in the variance of wages, a third ofthe unionization rate gap must
explain a third of0.020 (0.006 to 0.007). This represents 40 to 45 percent of
the relative increase in earnings inequality of0.016 (0.034 - 0.018) reported
by Blackburn and Bloom. The strength ofthe union movement in Canada thus
seems to be a major factor in explaining why wage inequality did not increase
as quickly in Canada as it did in the United States.
From a social welfare perspective, these benefits of unionization do not
necessarily come at no cost. As mentioned in section 3.2, unions may also97 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
cause efficiency losses by raising wages above their competitive level. Stan-
dard calculations indicate these losses are ofthe order of 0.2 percent ofGNP
in the United States and 0.5 percentofGNP in Canada. 28 These costs are small
and would be even smaller if labor contracts were negotiated efficiently. 29
They nevertheless illustrate the tradeoff Canada would face ifit were to move
to more "U.S.-like" labor market institutions. GNP per capita would increase
by 0.3 percent, but the variance of wages of men would increase by 8.5 per-
cent (40 percent of0.050/0.234).
3.7 Conclusion
The recent divergence in the extent ofunionism in Canada and in the United
States yields a unique opportunity to measure the impact of unionism on the
distribution of wages using a comparative perspective. The major findings of
the paper are the following:
1. Union relative wage effects are similar in Canada and in the United
States. In the case ofmen, the union wage differential is negatively related to
skills. This negative relationship is much less accentuated for women.
2. Private sector unionization is concentrated in the middle ofthe skill dis-
tribution, while public sector unionization is concentrated in the upper end of
the skill distribution. This explains why unionization in Canada and among
women is more skewed toward the upper end ofthe skill distribution.
3. The selection process into unionized jobs is different for men and
women in Canada. For women, the permanent unobservable component of
wages is positively correlated with the union status, while it is negatively
correlated with the union status for men. This is particularly true in the public
sector. There is no evidence of selection bias (on average) for men in the
United States.
4. Unions reduce the within-sector variance of wages for both men and
women.
5. Unions reduce the overall variance of wages by 14.5 percent for men in
Canada and by 6.3 percent for men in the United States, but they increase the
variance ofwages ofCanadian women by 4.1 percent. Differences in the pat-
tern and extent of unionism in Canada and in the United States explain 40
percent ofthe difference in wage inequality ofmen between the two countries.
28. The efficiency losses computed over the three tiers are equal to L6G(.5T1G~~G)' where 6j is a
weight that represents the fraction of the total wage bill that goes to union workers in tier G
(6 G = [w(G)/w]U(G)/3). The labor demand elasticities T1G chosen for the calculations are .5 in the
upper tier, .75 in the middle tier, and 1 in the lower tier.
29. The efficiency loss in the monopoly model ofunion occurs because the negotiated outcome
is not Pareto efficient. This result is very sensitive, however, to the assumption that unions cannot
bargain over employment. Labor contracts are said to be efficient when the firm and the union
bargain over wage and employment simultaneously. Under the strong version ofefficient contracts
(Brown and Ashenfelter 1986), the negotiated wage is purely an instrument to redistribute rents
between the parties. Unions cause neither efficiency losses nor employment distortions.98 Thomas Lemieux
These findings shed new light on the role ofunions in the relative distribu-
tion of wages of men and women in Canada and in the United States. More
remains to be learned, however, on why unions have such a different impact
on the wage distribution ofmen and women. A more thorough analysis ofthe
role of unions in the provision of nonwage benefits such as maternity leaves
and the role of unions in promoting wage equity in the workplace could shed
considerable light on these issues. It would also be interesting to measure




A Comparison ofthe LMAS and CPS Samples
The wage data used for Canada and the United States are based on supple-
ments to very similar labor force surveys (the LFS in Canada and the CPS in
the United States). The structures of.the supplements are quite different, how-
ever. The Canadian LMAS is based on a work history that asks workers about
all the jobs they held during the previous year. By contrast, the outgoing ro-
tation group supplement ofthe CPS asks people about the job they held during
the week ofthe survey. In both surveys, the earnings questions refer to usual,
as opposed to actual, earnings and hours. The earnings in the LMAS may
nevertheless be more noisy than in the CPS because ofthe recall bias problem.
On the one hand, the sampling frame for jobs (but not individuals) is differ-
ent in the two samples, since the CPS is only a snap shot while the LMAS
captures all the jobs held during the year. Short-duration jobs are thus more
likely to be captured in the LMAS. On the other hand, the LMAS sample used
in the cross-sectional analysis is limited to one job per person, and to jobs
lasting at least four weeks. These sample selection criteria reduce the proba-
bility ofsampling a short-duration job and thus make the LMAS sample more
comparable to the CPS sample.
Another difference between the two samples is that earnings are top coded
at 999$ a week in the CPS, while there is essentially no top coding in the
LMAS.30 In addition, only unallocated wages are used in the CPS, while all
wages are used in the LMAS because there are no allocation flags in the
LMAS.
The nature of the longitudinal data used is also quite different in the two
30. The LMAS user's guide indicates that Htwo records with total earnings from all jobs in 1986
in excess of$150,000 have had their hourly wage rates reduced to values which yield totals close
to 150,000$."99 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
surveys. The longitudinal CPS sample is obtained by matching people inter-
viewed twice in one year (rotation groups 4 and 8). The matching is imper-
fect, and the measurement error in changes in the union status variable is
substantial for the reasons mentioned in section 3.4. Card (1992) handles the
measurement error problem by using additional information from the CPS
validation study. The longitudinal LMAS sample is discussed in the main text.
Description ofthe Variables Used
The public use sample of the LMAS contains only bracketed information
on age and education. This explains why the continuous version ofthese var-
iables is not used in the analysis. The CPS age and education variables were
grouped in these five categories to make them comparable with the LMAS
data. The seven industry categories used in table 3.2 are primary industries,
manufacturing, construction, transportation and communication, trade, ser-
vices, and government (including health and education). The eight occupation
categories are managers, professionals, nurses, clerical workers, sales work-
ers, service workers, manual workers, and craft workers. The first six cate-
gories are considered white-collar workers, while the last two categories are
considered blue-collar workers.
Appendix B
A Regression-basedApproach to Analyze the Patterns
ofUnionization and Wages
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate how U(x) and aw(x) depend on a particular func-
tion of worker's characteristics, namely the estimated nonunion wage index.
Similar findings are obtained using a regression-based approach that describes
how wN(x), U(x), and aw(x) jointly depend on worker, job, and location char-
acteristics. Most ofthis analysis is limited to the case ofCanada.
Table 3B.l reports the differences in nonunion wages, unionization rates,
and the union wage gap associated with changes in various individual charac-
teristics of workers, when all other characteristics are held constant at their
sample mean. The first row ofthe table gives average values ofthe three out-
come variables by gender. Subsequent rows show the deviations from the
overall means associated with a particular characteristic (e.g., age 20-24)
holding constant all other characteristics. For simplicity, these deviations are
called excess predicted nonunion wages, union rates, or union wage gaps.
The entries in table 3B.l are calculated on the basis of separate wage re-
gressions fit to the union and nonunion sectors. These regressions include the
explanatory variables listed in table 3B.l plus a full set of interactions be-
tween age and education dummies. The pattern of results for age and educa-100 Thomas Lemieux
Table 3D.l Excess Nonunion Wage, Excess Union Density, and Excess Wage Gap by
Demographic Characteristics and Job Characteristics in Canada
Men Women
Excess Excess
Nonunion Excess Excess Nonunion Excess Excess
Wage Density Wage Gap Wage Density Wage Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average 2.361 0.463 0.136 2.006 0.379 0.211
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
Age
20....24 -0.233 -0.063 0.066 -0.127 -0.034 0.014
(0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
25-34 -0.039 -0.002 0.017 0.029 0.008 -0.010
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
35-44 0.102 0.011 -0.038 0.051 0.018 -0.012
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
45-54 0.101 0.023 -0.039 0.022 0.004 0.006
(0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016)
55-64 0.014 0.027 0.015 -0.054 -0.028 0.041
(0.017) (0.012) (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.028)
Education
Primary -0.159 -0.014 0.041 -0.140 -0.031 0.012
(0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.031)
High school -0.053 0.007 0.018 -0.057 -0.001 -0.011
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
More than high 0.007 0.007 -0.019 -0.025 -0.006 0.010
school (0.013) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.024)
Some postsecond- 0.070 0.002 0.006 0.069 0.006 0.020
ary (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013)
University 0.254 -0.018 -0.094 0.216 0.019 0.001
(0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019)
Mother tongue
English 0.007 -0.011 -0.001 0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
French -0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.003 0.014 0.020
(0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017)
Others -0.010 0.023 -0.014 -0.017 -0.005 -0.015
(0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006)
Race
White 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Nonwhite -0.060 -0.032 -0.007 0.024 -0.031 -0.093
(0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.020) (0.016) (0.031)
Marital status
Single -0.080 -0.011 0.043 -0.008 -0.006 0.000
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
Married 0.028 0.004 -0.015 0.004 0.003 -0.000




Nonunion Excess Excess Nonunion Excess Excess
Wage Density Wage Gap Wage Density Wage Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Province
Newfoundland -0.109 0.008 -0.067 -0.112 0.053 0.003
(0.017) (0.012) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.024)
Prince Edward -0.131 -0.032 -0.019 -0.097 -0.022 0.030
Island (0.023) (0.018) (0.033) (0.021) (0.017) (0.032)
Nova Scotia -0.093 -0.046 -0.013 -0.075 -0.043 -0.041
(0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.021)
New Brunswick -0.090 -0.037 0.026 -0.104 -0.039 0.051
(0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.020)
Quebec -0.019 0.095 0.020 0.014 0.079 -0.018
(0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
Ontario 0.046 -0.014 -0.008 0.032 -0.060 -0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
Manitoba -0.068 -0.034 0.059 -0.019 -0.001 0.009
(0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) (0.010) (0.020)
Saskatchewan 0.019 -0.001 -0.014 -0.006 0.043 0.024
(0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
Alberta 0.073 -0.083 -0.020 0.068 -0.028 -0.018
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.014)
British Columbia 0.095 0.082 0.022 0.054 0.053 0.008
(0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017)
Part-time status
Full-time 0.007 0.004 -0.007 -0.002 0.010 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Part-time - 0.118 -0.072 0.125 0.006 -0.027 0.011
(0.016) (0.013) (0.025) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
Firm size
Less than 20 -0.116 -0.213 0.051 -0.090 -0.172 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013)
20-99 -0.054 -0.086 0.021 -0.008 -0.024 0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.014)
100-499 0.020 0.047 -0.011 0.044 0.087 -0.018
(0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015)
500 and more 0.099 0.124 -0.049 0.084 0.121 -0.022
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
Don't know -0.020 0.073 0.026 -0.032 0.027 0.061
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014)
Tenure (years)
Less than 1 -0.134 -0.084 0.024 -0.131 -0.076 0.039
(0.009) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013)
1-5 -0.030 -0.045 -0.002 -0.034 -0.032 0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
5 and more 0.062 0.054 -0.006 0.098 0.068 -0.028





Nonunion Excess Excess Nonunion Excess Excess
Wage Density Wage Gap Wage Density Wage Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Occupation
Managers 0.136 -0.253 -0.048 0.169 -0.168 -0.073
(0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.026)
Professional 0.029 -0.072 -0.006 0.065 0.037 0.050
(0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.026)
Nurses -0.060 0.024 -0.067 0.165 0.055 -0.088
(0.059) (0.029) (0.066) (0.020) (0.012) (0.026)
Clerical -0.064 0.010 -0.048 0.027 -0.055 -0.046
(0.018) (0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019)
Sales -0.003 -0.150 -0.033 -0.057 -0.090 0.001
(0.015) (0.013) (0.030) (0.016) (0.014) (0.037)
Service - 0.161 -0.047 0.055 -0.198 -0.026 0.079
(0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.022)
Manual workers -0.030 0.096 0.029 -0.073 0.353 0.101
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.092) (0.068) (0.151)
Craft workers 0.061 0.132 -0.014 -0.038 0.387 0.165
(0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.119) (0.090) (0.190)
Industry
Primary 0.165 -0.139 -0.061 0.194 -0.288 0.069
(0.017) (0.014) (0.028) (0.034) (0.031) (0.097)
Manufacturing 0.029 -0.033 -0.036 0.017 -0.251 -0.078
(0.013) (0.009) (0.018) (0.055) (0.041) (0.090)
Construction 0.052 -0.108 0.138 0.126 -0.225 -0.176
(0.020) (0.016) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.126)
Transportation and -0.008 0.042 0.052 0.078 0.122 0.094
communication (0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.029)
Trade -0.096 -0.159 0.015 -0.100 -0.172 0.055
(0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.022)
Services -0.071 -0.129 -0.061 -0.027 -0.164 -0.031
(0.016) (0.013) (0.029) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020)
Public sector 0.015 0.301 -0.001 0.040 0.256 0.012
(0.016) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017)
Sources: Data from the 1986 cross-sectional file and the 1986-87 longitudinal file ofthe LMAS.
Note: The excess nonunion wage for a given value of a characteristic is the difference between the
predicted wage ofa worker with that value of the characteristic, holding all other characteristics at their
observed frequency distributions, and the mean wage in the sample.
tion is similar to the pattern uncovered in figures 3.1and 3.2. The excess wage
gap is inversely proportional to the excess nonunion wage (skills) for men,
but remains more or less constant for women. Table 3B.l also shows the re-
lationship among the excess predicted values of wN(x), U(x), and aw(x) for a
variety ofother worker, job, and location characteristics.103 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
The estimates in table 3B.l are summarized in table 3B.2 by looking at the
impact of unions on a selected number of wage differentials. Similar regres-
sions are estimated using the CPS sample for the United States except that
mother tongue is not included in those regressions. These union wage gaps
are calculated by adding the average wage gap to excess wage gaps like the
ones reported in table 3B.l (the wage gaps used are similar but not identical
to those in table 3B.l, since the underlying regressions are more parsimon-
ious).
The results indicate that unions reduce the university-high school differen-
tial for men in Canada and the United States, but increase it for women in
Canada. This is simply a restatement in regression terms ofthe findings illus-
trated in figures 3.1 and 3.2 (unions help more high-skill women than low-
skill women, especially in Canada). Unions also tend to help public sector
workers and blue-collar workers relative to private sector and white-collar
workers. Unions also revert the small wage disadvantage of French speakers
relative to English speakers in Canada, mostly because of the high unioniza-
tion rates in Quebec. Finally, unions increase the wage differential between






































Mature workers (35-44) versus young workers (20-24)
Wage differential 0.399 0.265
Effect ofunions - 0.035 - 0.005
University graduates versus high school graduates
Wage differential 0.393 0.353





Wage differential - 0.042
Effect ofunions - 0.040





Effect ofunions - 0.037
Notes: These effects are found by estimating separate wage regressions for union and nonunion
workers: the covariates used are the age dummies, the education dummies, the region dummies,
and dummy variables for marital status, part-time status, race, blue-collar, public sector, and
mother tongue (only for Canada). The regressions are used to calculate a union wage gap ~I\' for
each category of worker listed in the table. The effect of unions on the wage differential between
two groups A and B is simply UALlwA - UB~wB'104 Thomas Lemieux
whites and nonwhites in Canada. This goes in opposite direction to what is
typically found in the United States (here and in Ashenfelter 1972).
Appendix C
Robustness ofthe First-Differenced Estimates
Detailed first-differenced estimates for union joiners and union leavers are re-
ported in columns 2 and 3 oftable 3C.1 for men and women in Canada. The
results reported in columns 1-5 are obtained by fitting first-differenced regres-
sions that do not include controls for job characteristics. More precisely, con-
sider the following wage equation in which control variables are omitted for
the sake ofclarity:
where ~t is a time effect, e i is a time-invariant person-specific effect (fixed
effect), and aw is the union wage gap. The first-differenced version of this
equation is
dWit = d~t + dVitaw + dEit·
OLS estimates ofthe first-differenced version ofthe wage equation yield con-
sistent estimates of aw even when e i is correlated with the union coverage
variable Vit. Separate wage gap estimates a~l for union joiners (Vii = 0 and
Vi2 = 1) and d~o for union leavers (Vii = 1 and Vi2 = 0) are obtained by
fitting the following regression:
where V?l is an indicator variable equal to one for union joiners, while Vfo is
an indicator variable equal to one for union leavers.
Column 6 reproduces the estimates that were reported in tables 3.3 and 3.4,
with job characteristics included as regressors. Job characteristics are not used
in columns 1-5 for the sake of comparison with the results of Card (1992),
and because there are few degrees of freedom available in the small samples
of union joiners, union leavers, and dual-job holders. On the one hand, it is
preferable to include job characteristics in the regression when we try to mea-
sure the union wage gap for the same kind of workers holding the same kind
ofjobs. This may be particularly important when involuntary job leavers are
concentrated in few particular industries, for example, because of industrial
restructuring. On the other hand, jobs are choice variables, and it is not clear
they should be included in the definition ofskills used for the analysis by tier.
In any case, whether or not job characteristics are included in the regressions
does not affect the substance ofthe results.105 Unions and Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States
Table 3C.l Robustness ofFirst-Differenced Estimated for Canada
Demographic
and
Demographic Controls Only Job Controls
Involuntary Job Changers
Union Union All Dual-Job All Involuntary
All Joinersa Leaversa Changers Holders Job Changers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Men
Public and private pooled
Tier 1 0.242 0.209 0.270 0.243 0.219 0.207
(0.034) (0.054) (0.048) (0.025) (0.079) (0.035)
Tier 2 0.248 0.288 0.217 0.221 0.580 0.220
(0.036) (0.058) (0.051) (0.029) (0.082) (0.038)
Tier 3 0.064 0.060 0.068 0.064 0.636 0.006
(0.055) (0.090) (0.079) (0.040) (0.106) (0.059)
All tiers 0.204 0.202 0.207 0.196 0.376 0.163
(0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.017) (0.052) (0.024)
Private sector only
All tiers 0.207 0.201 0.206 0.210 0.380 0.162
(0.026) (0.042) (0.036) (0.019) (0.067) (0.026)
Public sector only
All tiers 0.191 0.195 0.205 0.126 0.347 0.166
(0.050) (0.074) (0.072) (0.039) (0.090) (0.050)
Observations 1,559 1,559 2,789 425 1,559
B. Women
Public and private pooled
Tier 1 0.245 0.254 0.236 0.238 0.319 0.190
(0.035) (0.053) (0.052) (0.026) (0.057) (0.037)
Tier 2 0.205 0.198 0.212 0.197 0.371 0.077
(0.046) (0.070) (0.070) (0.032) (0.097) (0.051)
Tier 3 0.264 0.380 0.157 0.254 0.255 0.191
(0.049) (0.077) (0.073) (0.036) (0.054) (0.054)
All tiers 0.240 0.281 0.200 0.233 0.308 0.167
(0.025) (0.038) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038) (0.026)
Private sector only
All tiers 0.256 0.244 0.223 0.224 0.416 0.186
(0.035) (0.052) (0.055) (0.024) (0.063) (0.037)
Public sector only
All tiers 0.197 0.289 0.147 0.204 0.182 0.150
(0.035) (0.052) (0.048) (0.026) (0.049) (0.035)
Observations 1,268 1,268 2,789 425 1,268
aThese estimates are obtained by estimating a first-differenced version of a wage equation in which the
union coverage variable is interacted with dummy variables for whether the worker is a union leaver or
a union joiner. There are 141 union joiners and 188 union leavers among the sample ofmen, while there
are 137 union joiners and 145 union Ieavers among the sample of women.106 Thomas Lemieux
In the case of men, the wage gap estimates for union joiners (0.202) and
union leavers (0.207) are nearly identical when all skill groups are pooled.
The estimated wage gaps differ more substantially for women (0.281 and
0.200). First-differenced estimates for the sample of all job changers, as op-
posed to involuntary changers only, are reported in column 4. The wage gap
estimates for that sample are very similar to the estimates for the sample of
involuntary changers only. Finally, the first-differenced procedure is applied
to an alternative sample ofdual-job holders. This sample consists of workers
who hold two jobs simultaneously over a period ofat least four weeks at any
time in 1986-87. The job on which the worker usually spends the most hours
per week is classified as the main job; the otherjob is classified as the second-
ary job. An alternative wage gap estimate is thus obtained by fitting the differ-
ence in wages on the two jobs to the differences in the characteristics of the
two jobs, including the union coverage status. The results are reported in col-
umn5.
Consider the results for all tiers together. The wage gap estimates based on
the sample of dual-job holders are larger (0.376 for men, 0.308 for women)
than any of the wage gap estimates based on samples ofjob changers. They
also imply that men are negatively selected into the union sector, while
women are positively selected into the union sector, as was found in tables 3.3
and 3.4. More research is nevertheless needed to explain why these wage gap
estimates are as large as they are.
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